The Committee to Nuke Elysium

According to BP, when workers attempted to activate the BOP from the top of the Deepwater Horizon rig before they were evacuated, nothing happened. The website ScienceInsider says that the shut off should have been automatic. Even after the rig sank, when BP and the Coast Guard tried to use robot submarines to trigger the BOP, it didn’t work.

There were multiple “Panic Buttons” to hit, even a so-called “Deadman” fail-safe that should have been engaged automatically. None of these security procedures worked. According to BP’s Hayward, “It is the ultimate safety system on any rig and there is no precedent for them failing.” In fact, Minerals Management Service records show that this BOP passed a test on April 10, less than two weeks before it failed. Thus far, no one has been able to explain it and Cameron has been conspicuously silent.

“We are all very curious,” said an insider who works for one of BP’s competitors. “What happened to all that equipment, all the computer power, all the automated systems and manpower in place, could not be invoked to stop this?”

A press release by Cameron last November does point to one clue. The company had just acquired NATCO, another wellhead and refinery equipment manufacturer. The merger gave Cameron, among other things, a subsidiary known as TEST Automation & Controls, which upgraded its automated control, safety and SCADA systems.

In short, Cameron uses SCADA systems, which collect data from various sensors and send it to a central computer on oil rigs. Instructions are not encrypted and are sometimes sent over the Internet. Among other things, SCADA monitors information from the blowout preventer, whose failure on the Deepwater Horizon apparently led to the disaster.

In 1999, when a pipeline burst in Bellingham, Washington, a SCADA failure was implicated. A software glitch in a SCADA system also slowed controls on the power grid during a successful computer attack in 2003. Incidentally, SCADA network and control systems also run dams, power plants, and gas and oil refineries.

A recent study funded by security vendor McAfee Inc and released in January by the Center for Strategic and International Studies at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland concluded that SCADA systems are being attacked by a variety of methods, individuals and gangs. Two-thirds of those surveyed said their SCADA systems were connected to an IP network or the Internet. About half of those said the connection created SCADA security issues that aren’t being addressed.

“I would describe the preparedness as quite spotty and in some cases quite lacking,” admitted Stewart Baker, a former senior official at the Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Agency who led the survey team. “Basic key security measures are still not widely adopted.” And the problem is getting worse. About 40 percent of those surveyed expected a major incident – an attack resulting in major consequences – within a year.